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ABSTRACT 
 
The United States Defense Industrial Base (USDIB) is an essential industry to both the 
economic prosperity of the US and its strategic control over many advanced military systems and 
technologies. The USDIB, which encompasses the industries of aerospace and defense, is a 
volatile industry – prone to many internal and external factors that cause demand to ebb and flow 
widely year over year. Among the factors that influence the volume of systems the USDIB 
delivers to its international customers are the arms export controls of the US. 
These controls impose a divergence from the historical US foreign policy of furthering an 
open exchange of ideas and liberalized trade. These controls, imposed by the Departments of 
Commerce, Defense, and State rigidly control all international presence of the Industry. The 
overlapping controls create an inability to conform to rapidly changing realpolitiks, leaving these 
controls in an archaic state. This, in turn, imposes a great deal of anxiety and expense upon 
managers within and outside of the USDIB. 
Using autoregressive integrated moving average time-series analyses, this paper confirms 
that the implementation of or amendment to broad arms export controls correlates to significant 
and near immediate declines in USDIB export volumes. In the context of the US’s share of world 
arms exports, these controls impose up to a 20% decline in export volume. 
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1 
Introduction 
“One at a time, regulations can seem quite reasonable. Put together, they can be self-defeating.” 
Dr. Neal Lane 
 
The United States Defense Industrial Base (USDIB) is an essential industry to both the 
economic prosperity of the US and its strategic control over many advanced military systems and 
technologies. The USDIB, which encompasses the industries of aerospace and defense, is a 
volatile industry – prone to many internal and external factors that cause demand to ebb and flow 
widely year to year. Among the factors that influence the volume of systems the USDIB delivers 
to its international customers are the arms export controls of the US. 
These controls impose a divergence from the historical US foreign policy of furthering an 
open exchange of ideas and liberalized trade. These controls, imposed by the Departments of 
Commerce (DoC), Defense (DoD), and State (DoS), rigidly control all international presence of 
the Industry. Over time, the overlapping controls have created an inability to conform to 
changing realpolitiks and left such controls in an archaic state, in turn imposing a great deal of 
anxiety and expense upon managers within and outside of the USDIB (Chermside, 2005). 
In this paper, I attempt to determine what financial implications are experienced by the 
USDIB because of the imposition of export controls that limit international deliveries of military 
and dual use technologies (DUTs) developed and manufactured by US firms. I begin by 
examining the prominent restrictions of arms exportation over the previous century, the strategic 
importance of the USDIB, and the theories providing an imperative for the Industry to engage in 
exportation. I then analyze time-series data of US arms exports. These analyses were found to 
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include a large deal of noise, preventing precise conclusions regarding the cost imposed upon the 
USDIB because of export controls. The enaction of significant controls were correlated to 
significant and near-immediate declines of up to 20% of the US’s share of world arms exports. 
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Exploring The Foreign Policy of the US 
The Finley-Moody Trading Corporation, a US based firm, is not a company the layman 
would consider to export “strategic commodities.” The firm built agricultural equipment, forage 
harvesters and self-unloading farm wagons to be precise. In 1962, Finley-Moody attempted to 
export two of these harvesters and eight of these wagons to the USSR. The Export 
Administration Act of 1949, however, set forth protocol that required exports of strategic 
commodities to be reviewed and approved, with a corresponding license attached to the 
commodities, by the Executive branch of the US government. The Act evolved to serve as a 
medium through which US foreign policy could be implemented. The license for Finley-Moody 
to export this farm equipment was denied under the pretext that such an export could 
significantly add to the economic potential of a Communist State – an event that was thought to 
be “detrimental” to US welfare (Abrahamson, 1995). This denial was followed by economic 
analyses at the Central Intelligence Agency. These analyses questioned whether the export could 
have added to economic prosperity or would simply have generated humanitarian dividends in 
the way of marginally increasing agricultural efficiencies. 
Occurrences of this type have been repeated countless times throughout the last century, 
during which US export controls of strategic importance have become increasingly codified and 
complex, and raises the question of what has been the general impact of these controls on US 
exports?  
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US Policy With Respect to Arms Proliferation 
This paper’s scope is limited to the leading US export controls regarding the exportation 
and corresponding proliferation of conventional weapons and DUTs, namely the Export 
Administration Acts and the Arms Export Control Acts. I have summarized notable introductions 
of and amendments to US export controls meeting the criteria of examination for this paper in 
Table 1. 
Modern US limitations to the dissemination of weapons have their base in the 1917 
Trading with the Enemy Act (TEA) and the Neutrality Acts of the 1930’s (United States 
Department of State, 1983). TEA, initially, made trade with an enemy, or ally of an enemy, of 
the US during times of war illegal. “Trade” was broadly defined to include the satisfying of 
debts, entering into or execution of contracts, extension of credit, and any transferring of asset 
between any US entity and an international counterparty. TEA has been amended over time to 
include such things as Executive Order 6102, which forbade the hoarding of gold by US citizens 
(Cornell Law School). Parts of the Act are still in effect, and largely used as an embargo 
enforcement mechanism for both general commercial trade and the trade of armaments (Field, 
2009). Of the multiple Neutrality Acts of the 1930’s, the 1939 Act was unique in that it was the 
first legislation to specify export and import licensing protocol for armaments (US Department 
of State Office of the Historian). Export controls found their golden age in the Post-World War II 
period. With the weaponization of nuclear technologies and the formation of the Warsaw Pact, 
the US moved to prevent the proliferation of advanced weapons systems. For conventional 
weapons, such restrictions began with the Export Control Act (ECA) of 1949: the first arms 
control-intensive legislation passed by the US. The Act was, broadly, designed for control of the 
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exportation of military and DUT wares for the reasons of national security, foreign policy, and 
short supply situations (Federation of American Scientists, 1998). The short supply clause was 
novel, as it specified that US exports containing strategic inputs to which the international supply 
had dwindled should be curtailed to preserve US access to such inputs. The Act remained in 
effect from 1949-1969, was reinstated in 1979, and lapsed in 1994 (Swan, 1993).  
 
Table 1 
Major Restrictions to US Arms Exports. 
Trading with the Enemy Act 
(TEA) 
1917 Disallowed US entities to trade with entities of 
an enemy state during times of war.  
Neutrality Act of 1939 1939 Export and import licenses first required for 
armaments. 
Export Control Act (ECA) 1949 Introduced extraterritorial influence to arms 
controls, by restricting the trade of strategic 
military goods to nations who were furthering or 
supporting Communist ideology.                                                     
Became a medium for incorporating the 
guidance of the Coordinating Committee of the 
Consultative Group (COCOM). 
Export Administration Act (EAA) 1969 Tempered the control of trade.                                                       
Required the President to be prepared to 
demonstrate to Congress why policy/security 
interest took precedent over liberalized trade. 
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 1976 Controls the export of defense articles and 
services which are inherently military.                                                                                                 
DoS administers the Act.                                                            
Considered an enactment of the DoD's Defense 
Science Board "Bucy Report" recommendations.                                                            
Established the Munitions Control List (MCL) to 
organize those categories of systems to be 
controlled by the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR).                                                                   
Established ITAR, requiring exporters to apply 
for and receive license to export a good/service 
list on the MCL. 
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Table 1: Continued. 
Export Administration Act of 
1969 Amendment 
1977 Intended to be a non-facilitation of state 
terrorism. 
Extended jurisdiction of US export controls to 
re-exports by overseas subsidiaries of US firms. 
International Economic 
Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) 
1977 Provides the President authorization to control 
international finances, exports, and imports.                                                                                
To activate, President must declare a national 
emergency that possess an "unusual and 
extraordinary threat" to national security, foreign 
policy, or the domestic economy. 
Export Administration Act of 
1979 
1979 Limited the President's imposition of foreign 
policy controls such that imposed controls are to 
be socially efficient: cost to US entities must not 
exceed the benefit to the US foreign policy 
objectives.                                                              
Made exportation to states determined by the 
Secretary of State to have repeatedly supported 
terrorism more difficult. 
Export Administration Act of 
1979 Amendment 
1985 Increased Congress's presence in determining 
which countries to be blocked from receiving 
US arms shipments. 
Omnibus Trade & 
Competitiveness Act 
1989 Relaxed export licensing protocols to COCOM 
members and to states with COCOM-like 
policies.                                                      
Encouraged the trade of DUTs by limiting when 
controls can be applied to these technologies. 
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 
Amendment 
1999 Assigned ITAR licensing responsibilities to 
Department of State. 
 
 
The importance of the ECA following 1969 has been insignificant in terms of controlling 
US arms exports because of the enaction of the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1969 (the 
1969 Act). The 1969 Act was a temperance of trade controls for military technologies. It was 
largely a continuation of the 1949 ECA, with a major revision that required the President to be 
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prepared to demonstrate to Congress as to why policy or security interests superseded free trade 
(Swan, 1993).  
The 1969 Act was replaced by the 1979 Act. As amended, the 1979 Act provided the 
"authority to regulate exports, to improve the efficiency of export regulation, and to minimize 
interference with the ability to engage in commerce." The improvements in efficiency were, in 
part, derived by a requirement for the President to be prepared to present Congress with evidence 
that benefits to foreign policy did not supersede the costs incurred by the USDIB by way of 
decreased international sales. The 1979 Act also made the exportation of arms and DUTs to 
those states determined by the Secretary of State to have supported terrorism more difficult than 
under past controls and increased Congress’s presence in export protocols (Swan, 1993).  
The 1979 Act remained in effect until September of 1990. During the period between 
enaction and expiration, there were several amendments to the Act. A 1985 Amendment required 
the President to consult with several Congressional Committees before altering foreign policy, 
thereby further increasing Congress’s role in controlling military and DUT exports. The 1988 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (OTCA), which was tagged to the 1979 EAA, 
established a protocol for the President to determine what national security issues could arise 
from foreign mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers of USDIB companies, and allowed suspect 
transactions to be suspended or barred. The OTCA also shortened the maximum time allowed to 
complete a review of a proposed international arms transaction from 120 days to 90 days, 
thereby expediting the licensing process (US House Select Committee on US National Security 
and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China). 
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The 1979 Act was kept alive by Executive Order 12730, which invoked the authority 
granted by the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA). The IEEPA was 
enacted in 1977, and gave the President the power to control imports, exports, and international 
finance by declaring a national emergency because of an “unusual and extraordinary threat” 
arising in part or whole outside of the US. Historically, the IEEPA has been used to, among other 
things, freeze lending to South African entities, to embargo Libya, and to block exports to 
Nicaragua. Executive Order 12370 was implemented because a lapse of the EAA was believed to 
derail Congressional interests in the matter of revising the 1979 Act and the imminent conflict 
with Iraq emphasized the need to further embargo arms from those states supporting terrorism 
(Swan, 1993). Public Laws 103-10 and 102-277 kept the 1979 Act in force, following Executive 
Order 12370, until August 1994 (US House Select Committee on US National Security and 
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China). 
In all, the series of Export Administration Acts were a well-balanced attempt to maximize 
benefits to the USDIB & US foreign policy interests. There was, however, an externality: the 
“Bucy Report.” 
The DoD’s Defense Science Board released a report, the Bucy Report, in 1976 
expressing concern that the US was loosing its technological advantage over Communist nations. 
Communist states were able to circumvent the costly and lengthy research and development 
phases of military technologies by acquiring advanced weapons systems through alternative 
procurement methods. The Board recommended that licensing authorities focus on preventing 
these alternative procurement channels from delivering sophisticated hardware and knowhow to 
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Communist states. Amendments were made to the 1969 EAA in 1977, providing the US with 
jurisdiction over re-exports of defense items (Swan, 1993). 
In this environment of concern that proliferation of US military items would erode the 
US’s technological and strategic advantage over the Communist states, the Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976 (AECA) was passed. The AECA is a three-part Act: establishing the Munitions 
Control List (MCL), establishing the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), and the 
general provisions contained in the AECA (Van Atta et al., 2007). 
The MCL is the “heart” of modern licensing protocol. It is currently broken into 13 
categories of articles, series, and technical data covering everything from combat shotguns to 
nuclear submarines (United States Munitions List). The MCL is the codified portion of the 
AECA. The ITAR is the subjective portion, providing guidance to inferring from the MCL and 
providing the protocol to apply for a license to export a MCL listed commodity or service. 
A frequent qualm regarding the AECA, ITAR, and MCL is the overreaching broadness of 
definitions provided in these items. The term “export” includes the shipment of a defense system, 
transference of ownership or license from a domestic entity to a foreign entity, the disclosure of 
technical data to a foreign entity, the taking of technical drawings or hard-copies of data outside 
of the US, and the performance of “defense services” for a foreign entity. The location of 
disclosure, transference, or performance for such exports does not matter, as the Act applies to 
all US persons with extraterritorial jurisdiction. “Technical data” includes all data carrying 
classification of classified or above, information with a Secrecy Order protection attached, and 
information directly relating to the design, manufacturing, and operation of defense articles. 
Technical data does not include generally know science, mathematic, and engineering 
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knowledge. The subjectivity and broadness of these definitions and the need for adaptation to 
concurrently occur with scientific advancement occasionally draws complaint from academia 
and industry as being inhibitive to the advancement of high-tech goods through international 
collaborations (Lane, 2001). 
To this, the DoS reaffirms that the US policy is not to license exports to countries 
supporting communism, terrorism, or are in a general state of upheaval for which the benefit of 
issuing an export license is less than the benefit to restrict the export in accordance with US 
foreign policy at the time of license application (Swan, 1993).  
Figure 1 shows the US share of total arms exported worldwide for the period of 1965-
1994. This figure is inserted to show the US market share of arms exports before and following 
the introduction of the AECA, ITAR, and the MCL. 
Per Figure 1, it is evident that the US share of total arms exports was at a relative high in 
1976, at 44.83%. This is slightly less than what the US share was in 1965, at 44.86%. The US 
share fell to 37.78% in 1977, 33.75% in 1978, and bottoming out at 25.39% in 1979. The 1979 
US export share was the lowest during the past sixty years of reported data. The US share did not 
rise above the 1976 share until 1991, at 45.09%.  
Other than occasional revisions to the categorization and organization of the MCL, little has 
changed to the AECA since its 1976 introduction. One of the notable revisions occurred in 1999, 
when the responsibility of license review and approval or denial was passed from the DoC to the 
DoS. This came amid a series of mid 1990’s controversy regarding the US satellite industry 
proliferating technology to Chinese interests. Politicians determined the DoS would be better 
suited to review and decide upon the ITAR licenses. This transfer of licensing authority greatly 
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increased the complexity of ITAR protocol (Bender, 2006; Waite & Schwartz, 2007). Figure 2 
shows the number of consent agreements for settlement regarding a violation of AECA or ITAR 
each year from 1980-2010. 
 
Figure 1 
US Share of World Arms Exports, 1965-1994. 
 
Notes: Based on SIPRI TIV Database results, period 1965-1994. For expanded periods or other nations’ 
shares, see Appendix A. 
 
 
Beginning in the mid 1990’s the number of violations of AECA and ITAR began to 
increase, corresponding with fears that Beijing had acquired proprietary satellite technology.  
From the period 1980-1998, when the DoC was charged with ITAR licensing, there were 9 
reported ITAR violations made by US firms. This is compared to 35 reported violations during 
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the period 1999-2010, when the DoS assumed responsibility for licensing. Notably, violations 
spiked in 1999, the year the DoS took over the licensing procedures. We can deduct that 
violations occur more often when political concern over the proliferation of MCL items is 
highest and when politicians decidedly make exportation more restrictive through changes to the 
Act (Hudson, 2008). 
 
Figure 2 
AECA & ITAR Violations, 1980-2010 
 
 
Notes: Based on the consent agreements published by the Assistant Secretary for Political-
Military Affairs, pursuant to 22 CFR §127.10, of violations of the AECA and ITAR. Consent 
agreements for the above violations are published on the US DoS Directorate of Defense Trade 
Controls webpage. 
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An examination of Table 2 indicates that the US is not entirely restrictive in its 
exportation policy of weapons and corresponding knowhow. 
The US has exported to and imported from more foreign customers than any other 
member of the UNSC member (and any non-UNSC state) over period of 1950-2010, for which 
data is available. This does not nullify the complaints of excessively strict export controls. US 
export controls are widely seen by policy experts as being endogenous, rather than exogenous 
(Trefler, 1993). An endogenous variable is one that is the product of inputs. That is, it is the 
output of some function. An exogenous variable is the complement: the input to some function. 
This is to say that the US implements export controls not to influence foreign policy, but directly 
as foreign policy. 
 
Table 2 
Summarizing the Number of Nations Exported To, Imported From, and Total Arms Trade 
Partners of UN Security Council Member States, Period 1950-2010. 
Nation Exported To Imported From Total Trade Partners 
China 71 12 81 
France 122 15 122 
Russian Federation 83 4 86 
United Kingdom 117 19 118 
United States 159 26 161 
USSR 74 8 75 
 
Notes: Based on SIPRI TIV Database results, period 1950-2010. Exported To denotes the number of states the 
UNSC member state exported arms to, and Imported From denotes the number of states the UNSC member 
state imported arms from. Total Trade Partners is the sum of the nations the UNSC member state exported to 
or imported from during the period without double-counting. SIPRI considers NATO and the UN as separate 
trade partners. SIPRI data contains a “unknown country” category that is not included in this table, as the 
unknown categorization can contain multiple countries that are not able to be differentiated. 
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Defining the Strategic and Economic Importance of the USDIB 
The USDIB is a primary driver of the US economy and catalyst for the technical 
innovation that has allowed the US to establish and maintain its comparative advantage in 
advanced sciences (Voors, 2003; James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 2009). This 
advantage is beginning to wane. Central to this decline is an oversight as to the strategic and 
economic importance of international collaborations when policy is implemented (Lane, 2001). 
Included in this section is an examination of leading theories relating to international sales and 
diversification of the USDIB. 
 
The USDIB and the Soviet Collapse 
The Soviet Union of the mid and late 1980’s was primed for dissolution. With Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985 and the Eastern Bloc collapse of 1989, the “implosion” of the 
Warsaw Pact of 1991 was imminent (Thorton, 2007). The repercussions of the breakup were 
global. For the first time in nearly 60 years, the developed world was, largely, at peace as the US 
assumed the role of sole military superpower. 
This new peace created another void – in the demand for new advanced weapons 
platforms. The US cultivated a system from which its arsenal is supplied by private contractors 
and subcontractor, who have taken up specialization in sub-segments of the weapons’ market. 
The decreased demand for military technologies left such contractors greatly exposed to the 
geopolitical repercussions of the Soviet collapse (Sapolsky & Gholz, 1999), more so than if these 
suppliers were diversified in other high-tech industries. Inherently, the US itself was now at risk: 
15 
if its suppliers of weapons collapsed, the US could plummet from its placement of sole 
superpower because of an inability to internally equip its military and security forces. 
 
The Encouraged Consolidation 
To prevent this concurrent collapse in the USDIB, the executive branch of the US 
government moved quickly to coordinate and subsidize consolidations of major defense players. 
Though politically controversial, the Clinton Administration introduced a series of incentives for 
contractors to attain efficiencies, primarily in the research and development of dual use 
technology (DUT). These subsidies, provided primarily through DoD research funding, were 
seen as a powerful force in staying the US weapon supply (Oden, 1999). However, the 
occurrence of “peace dividends,” from development of DUTs, has remained inconclusive 
(Thorton, 2007). It has been determined, using the DIBs of small and medium sized European 
countries as proxies, that horizontal consolidation was essential (Struys, 2004). Notable 
consolidations within the USDIB following the Soviet collapse included Northrop merging 
Grumman Aerospace in 1994, Lockheed merging with Martin Marietta in 1995, and Boeing’s 
acquisition of McDonnell Douglas in 1997. A recent Wall Street Journal article concluded that of 
the $700 billion 2009 Pentagon budget, approximately $400 billion went to “The Defense Half 
Dozen” – Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon, and 
United Technologies (Hodge, 2011), and a 2002 RAND report found “the number of defense 
contractors that accounted for two-thirds of all defense sales shrank by 60 percent between 1990 
and 1998.” (Lorell, 2002). These mergers created significant welfare losses (i.e. lost jobs), 
resulting from the allocative inefficiencies that accompany the merger specific efficiencies (i.e. 
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cost savings from economies of scale) (Blair, 2010). Using the industry’s current health and the 
DoD’s anxiety regarding future mergers reducing the department’s monopsony power (Hodge, 
2011) as measures of the effect of the horizontal mergers, we can deduct that the net welfare 
effect has been positive. 
 
The Theory of World Politics Cycles and the USDIB 
It is regarded that world politics cycles through three broad phases: bipolarity, 
unipolarity, and multipower (Little & Smith, 2006). During the bipolar phase, the world is 
widely seen as “stable.” Two powerful states with equal military capabilities and opposing 
interests or ideology square off to test the other’s abilities. Other nations align themselves with 
one of the two superpowers. Outright conflict is rare, but proxy wars occasionally occur. After 
some period, one of the two superpowers is forced to concede, typically because of an internal 
revolution or macroeconomic turmoil. This brings about the unipolar phase, under which one of 
the bipolar superpowers emerges as the dominant source of world power. This superpower 
possesses the means to deter or incite conflict as it sees necessary in the furtherance of its 
interests. Smaller wars, typically civil wars, arise in nations with little significance economically 
or strategically to the superpower as tensions escalate in the vacuum left by the dissolution of the 
former superpower of the bipolar phase. It is believed that, as long as responsible policies are 
implemented by the sole superpower, the unipolar phase should last approximately as long as the 
bipolar phase. As the unipolar player inevitably sees its geopolitical control erode, the world 
becomes a much more dangerous place. Coalitions develop between states with like motives and 
trading ties (Sweo & Gordon, 2009). As these imbalanced coalitions vie for prominence, smaller 
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members of a coalition will attempt to switch their alliances so to lever their importance beyond 
what their military and economic powers dictate. These shifting states often create the volatility 
that degrades to world war. These world wars cause weaker alliances to be absorbed by stronger 
ones. The end result is two camps of coalitions, each dominated by the strongest member state, 
thus renewing the cycle of world politics. 
Arguably, had the US government not taken immediate actions to preserve the USDIB, 
the US would have broken with the “responsible policies” dictated by the Little and Smith three 
phase theory of world politics. Accordingly, had such policy not been taken, the US would have 
had its monopoly on world politics quickly eroded, resulting in what could have been the most 
dangerous multipower struggle the world would have experienced, as Cold War littered the 
world with stockpiles of both conventional and nonconventional caches that would have given 
the vying multipower coalitions the means to bloodily bring the world back to a bipolar phase. 
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The Export Imperative 
Nations (like firms) intend to maintain the minimal amount of inventory to meet the 
demands of current geopolitical conditions. End-users of military goods are not alone in 
influencing the market conditions. Technological advances made by the USDIB, EDIB 
(European Defense Industrial Base), and other innovating parties have shortened the 
technological refresh cycle to the point that it is not economically efficient to hold large 
equipment reserves, even during times of active war (Brill, 2007). Seemingly in conflict with the 
technological refresh cycle is the increasingly robustness of equipment, marketed by contractors 
to indicate the need for less servicing and higher theater reliability (Rosenwald, 2007). Simply, 
the end-user of the equipment will not purchase military technologies unless it has (or 
anticipates) active uses for such technology within a very short time following receipt of 
equipment. And when the user does purchase equipment, it seeks those goods that will last the 
longest (Thorton, 2007). Acknowledging this, it must be noted that brining a new product to 
market is, at best, a capital and manpower intensive feat. This is especially true in a high-tech 
industry. But it is vital for such industries to maintain their technological competitive advantage. 
Other high-tech industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry, can more easily export their 
products to a wider consumer base than the USDIB can, because of export controls. 
Because of these market forces, members of the USDIB are reliant upon international 
customers to provide supplementary cash flows when domestic demand decreases and to offset 
the costly research and development (Hartley, 2008). Below, I explore several financial and 
economic theories relating to the use of exportation as a means to stay the US’s technological 
edge in military and DUT technologies. 
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The Theory of Comparative Advantage 
Comparative advantage is the theory that a nation can specialize in the production of 
goods and services, exporting that which they specialize in and importing that which they cannot 
produce at a lower opportunity cost than a trading partner (Maneschi, 2008). This is the 
fundamental theory to understanding why international trade is a profit-producing mechanism for 
society (Lutz, 2008). The cornerstone to comparative advantage is laissez faire: the uninhibited 
flow of goods, services, and capital across international bounds. Comparative advantage is 
inhibited by trade controls, which make trade artificially more costly. (McConnell & Brue, 
2008). This added cost reduces the incentives to international trade, which are primarily the 
exploration of a lower opportunity cost. 
Classical economist David Ricardo is credited with much of the fundamental theory of 
comparative advantage. A conceptualization of his theory follows: 
 
Let us assume that the US and Brazil each want satellites and lumber. The US can 
produce a unit of orbital satellites at a cost of 100 men and an equivalent unit of lumber at a cost 
of 40 men. Brazil can produce satellites and lumber at a cost of 125 and 50 men, respectively. 
Under this arrangement, the US will produce satellites and trade for Brazilian lumber because the 
opportunity cost of this trade agreement is lowest: 100/50 < 125/40. 
 
Let us further assume that each country has 250 units of cumulative labor for the 
production of these goods. Table 3 shows the output assuming the US and Brazil devote half of 
their labor force to the production of satellites and half to lumber without trade or specialization: 
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Table 3 
Total Goods Produced without Trade or Specialization 
 US Brazil Total 
Satellites  2.5 1 3.5 
Lumber 1.25 2 3.25 
Total 3.75 3 6.75 
 
Table 4 depicts the benefits generated if the US and Brazil specialize in the production of 
the goods they possess a comparative advantage: 
 
Table 4 
Total Goods Produced with Specialization & Trade 
 US Brazil Total 
Satellites  2.5 0 2.5 
Lumber 0 5 5 
Total 2.5 5 7.5 
 
We can see that by specializing and trading, the US and Brazil can collectively generate 
an additional 0.75 unit of goods: 6.75 units without specialization and trade, 7.5 units with. Both 
the US and Brazil are in a position to capitalize by specializing and trading, as long as the lower 
opportunity costs holds. 
If the Brazilian government imposes a tariff on foreign satellites, the Brazilian importers 
become increasingly indifferent to using foreign or domestic sources. This, however, eliminates 
the social cost savings to Brazil. 
Alternatively, if the US implemented restrictive exportation policies regarding satellites, 
Brazil looses incentive to import from the US. The Brazilians may look to Europe or domestic 
suppliers for a supply of commercial jets. They may revise their strategy, and produce satellites 
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and import lumber. Regardless, if restrictions to the exportation of US satellites are too high, US 
satellite manufactures have a diminished incentive to produce. 
From the above example, we can observe that restrictive trade reduces the incentive to 
trade. Many social economists have taken the stance that modern international trade theory 
should not incorporate benefits to the trading states. It is the multinational corporations (MNCs) 
that benefit from trade, with no inclination to benefit society (Lutz, 2008). This agreement has 
grown in momentum in recent years, and is frequently used as the basis for implementing 
mechanisms that discourage socially damaging deals from occurring. Let us bring the USDIB 
into the mix: as shown from the review of US arms export restrictions, the US government is 
heavily integrated into the international trade of the USDIB’s products and services. Because 
every export of an MCL listed item must be applied for, reviewed by the DoS, and decided upon 
with respect to foreign policy, the US possesses a monopoly in allowing international export of 
military technologies. 
One the basis of comparative advantage theory and the restrictive trade policies of the 
US, I submit the following hypotheses for testing: 
 
H1: US legislation and acts restricting US arms exportation will adversely affect the US 
market share of world arms exports. 
 
H2: US legislation and acts restricting US arms exportation will have no impact on the 
US market share of world arms exports. 
 
The US has access to cutting-edge technology and world-renowned research labs. This 
access and the provisions of US government research and development dollars to develop and 
refine technical instruments for both military and civilian applications has established and 
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maintained the US’s comparative advantage in the development and production of advanced 
systems. This advantage is waning (Lane, 2001). 
The strict export controls, primarily the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (explored in 
detail above), are cited as a primary reason for this fading lead in advanced sciences. In a recent 
interview with The Economist, Lon Rains, an editor for Space News, voiced a growing industry 
consensus that ITAR licensing has “sped up the inevitable proliferation of advanced technology, 
by forcing other countries to find other means of obtaining [dual use technologies] that had 
previously been manufactured only in the United States.” This notion is an interesting 
compliment to Hypotheses1 and 2. It asserts that US exports of dual use and military 
technologies are negatively correlated to the exports of other nations. Inspired by Rains 
perception, I submit the following additional hypotheses for testing:  
 
H3: US export policy regarding the trade of arms causes the US share of the market to 
correlate to changes in the market share of fellow UNSC members. 
 
H4: US export policy regarding the trade of arms does not cause correlation between US 
share of the market and the market share of fellow UNSC members. 
 
I will examine these hypotheses in detail in Methodology and Analyses section below. 
 
Modern Portfolio Theory 
Markowitz’s Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) gave added reason for multinational 
corporations (MNC’s) to construct a diversified portfolio of income streams so to yield greater 
returns with less variability (Peavy & Vaughn-Rauscher, 1994). By including international 
markets with low or negative correlation to a MNC’s domestic market to the MNC’s portfolio of 
23 
income streams, the firm can move towards the theoretical efficient allocation that provides the 
optimum risk-return combination of assets as dictated by the firm’s industry (Peavy & Vaughn-
Rauscher, 1994). Per MPT, diversification is simply the combining of two or more income 
streams, with some variance associated with each (Swisher & Kasten, 2005). MPT predicts that a 
drop in total unsystematic variance, with diminishing returns to scale, will occur in the portfolio 
that is an MNC as more income streams (markets/international trading partners) are added. This 
is caused by the weighted averaging effect present in the MPT model. The diversification 
imperative within the USDIB comes from the fact that nations do not engage in military 
purchases with perfect correlation. As such, the expected variance of a DIB firm is best 
minimized by bringing together independent, non-interactive cash flows via the process of 
unrelated diversification (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). 
A central flaw to MPT, and its empirical analogue of the capital asset pricing model, is 
that it is designed for securities’ management (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994). The model’s 
differentiation between the components of a firm’s risk – systematic risk and unsystematic risk – 
is too rigid to readily apply to the valuation of non-securities assets. Another primary flaw 
regarding MPT with respect to corporate diversification is the belief that diversification will 
lower a firm’s unsystematic risk, but not the systematic component. Lubatkin and Chatterjee’s 
study of the dynamics of the two risk components found they are not independent of each other: 
rather, they are dependent and interrelated. 
Unsystematic risk is better known as business specific risk, or shareholder risk. Sources 
of unsystematic risk are regarded as being able to be diversified away by combining low or 
negative correlated assets. Such sources can include the loss of a major customer to a rival, the 
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untimely death of an executive, and, among other things, the loss of a monopoly in critical 
technology know-how. Researchers estimate unsystematic risk of a firm by finding the standard 
deviation in the error term obtained by regressing the overall returns of the firm’s stock flow to 
the overall returns of the stock market. Unsystematic risk has been found by Miller & Bromiley 
(1990) to be moderately correlated to income stream variability. 
Systematic risks, or macroeconomic risks, are those sources of uncertainty affecting all 
firms. Such sources can include changes to monetary policy, changes to tax law, and, among 
other things, market demographics. Financially, systematic risk is considered to be the 
correlation of variability in a firm’s stock returns to macroeconomic influences. Put in a more 
generalized manner, it is the sensitivity of a firm’s return to those macroeconomic forces 
(Markowitz, 1952). Systematic risk is, empirically, the coefficient of market returns regressed 
against a firm’s stock return. Shareholders will price firms with lower systematic risk with a 
premium, all else equal (Van Horne, 1980).  
It is important to note that within these definitions of we find that central flaw to MPT 
with respect to corporate diversification: the risk component is a derivative of a regression of the 
firm’s stock returns against the market’s return. It is difficult, if at all possible, to isolate and 
examine the influence one income stream has on a MNC’s stock return. As such, the analyses 
used below examine the macro exportation trends within the USDIB. 
Returning to MPT, there is much conceptual confusion about which risk metric is the 
optimum one to diversify. To this, it has been suggested that the decision is, of course, relative. 
This is because the risks are interdependent and because a risk is specific to a firm – meaning 
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that firms are not equally sensitive to a risk (Moyer & Chatfield, 1983; Subrahamanyum & 
Thomadakis, 1980; Sullivan, 1977).  
Proponents of corporate diversification advocate that firms horizontally integrate those 
synergistically interrelated business units (Bettis & Hall, 1982; Lubatkin & O’Neil, 1987; 
Chatterjee & Lubatkin, 1990). These researchers have recognized that MPT is designed for 
securities management, and have extended the model’s core concepts to apply to firm managers 
contemplating risk mitigation strategies. Whereas MPT assumes management of the firm to be 
passive, and that cash flows cannot be altered, the theory of strategic management – supported 
by the underlying concepts of the MPT model – assumes that the managers of firms can 
influence the risk profiles of both unsystematic and systematic components by adjusting their 
control of the market. 
To correct for this, modern practitioners of managerial sciences suggest that strategic 
management provides a better explanation of the risk mitigations derived from corporate 
diversification. 
 
Strategic Management 
This exploration of strategic management theory is intentionally brief for reasons 
explored below. 
Strategic management, in a generalized sense, is the study of how prominent intended 
and emergent initiatives undertaken by a firm’s management enhance the performance of the 
firm through the utilization of its resources (Nag, Hambrick, & Chen, 2007). By developing the 
strategic mission, vision, objectives, policies, and plans of the firm, often in terms of plans or 
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projects, and then allocating the firm’s resources to execute such plans and projects, the 
managers proactively guide their firms on behalf of the interests of the firm’s owners. 
Hoskisson and Hitt (1990) theorized that the relationship between systematic and 
unsystematic risk were not linear, rather the relationship is curvilinear. This was proven by 
Markides (1992) and further explored by Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994). Lubatkin and 
Chatterjee provide evidence that risk, regardless of how it is measured, can be mitigated by 
“midrange” diversification. By the midrange diversification, it is suggested that firms should 
engage in activities and markets that are included in or naturally symbiotic to their core 
competencies. Firms diversifying into unrelated markets or business were found to increase their 
unsystematic risk exposure, even though they empirically offset such risk per MPT. For USDIB 
players, such a symbiotic diversification would likely include the exploitation of DUT to provide 
for a civilian market cash flow. Defense firms have historically had great success in either 
licensing their technology and know how for civilian uses or for directly selling to civilian 
consumers (Feldman, 2008). 
Further Lubatkin and Chatterjee determined that systematic risk includes a diversifiable 
component: by diversifying in a constrained manner, firms are able to synergize and protect from 
macroeconomic unknowns. The primary justification for this ability to influence systematic risk 
is the ability of managers to directly influence the competitive position of their firm.  
Because data is not currently available regarding the international exportation details of 
USDIB firms for a suitable period of time, the testing of a hypothesis based in strategic 
management theory is not feasible. 
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Methodology and Analyses 
Before proceeding, I must acknowledge that this data contains only that which is 
publically available. Thus, analyses of this data are limited. I have attempted to provide readers 
with an encompassing picture of US international arms trends, and only drawn conclusions on 
the basis of statistically significant results. 
 
Review of the Data Source 
The data my analyses draw from have has been generously provided by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI was established by the Swedish 
government in 1966 and collects official government and industry data to quantify the value of 
“major conventional weapons” exported by states. SIPRI also monitors the individual DIB 
players. Having been cited by many mainstream publications, including the Economist and 
Foreign Policy, SIPRI has become the international authority in documenting and reporting 
world arms trade from 1950-present. 
SIPRI has determined that one trend emerging in the trade of arms is the increase to 
transparency. Many NATO and EU member states have voluntarily published national reports on 
arms exports, typically with annual frequency (Wogau & Rapp-Jung, 2008). The first nation to 
begin such reports was the US, who has been legally obligated to do so since 1961, inclusive 
(Holtom & Bromley, 2011). Holtom & Bromley expect NATO & EU states to continue such 
reporting, and to increasingly provide additional details (i.e. license denials and brokering 
licenses). It is not anticipate that such transparent reports will be voluntarily published by other 
states in the near future (Weber & Bromley, 2011). Because of the US’s obligation to report on 
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USDIB arms exports, it can be expected this data is of the highest accuracy available by public 
means. 
SIPRI’s data refers only to the actual delivery of major conventional weapons, and is 
expressed as trend indicator values (TIVs) in constant 1990 prices (US$ m). This adjustment for 
constant 1990 prices allows the analyses to be freed of biases resulting from inflation and 
exchange rate differentials. The TIV is not a representation of the value of the goods exported, 
but of the volume exported per purchasing power parity. Naturally, this allows for the 
measurement of trends in the flow of weapons and not in the flow of funds. Because the TIVs do 
not represent a financial value, they cannot be used to determine importance to economic 
metrics, such as gross domestic product, but do allow for market share calculations. SIPRI 
calculates the TIVs, through its Arms Transfer Project, from official government and industry 
reports. The Export TIV tables utilized are included in Appendix I. These tables provide the total 
Export TIV for country, group, or international body (i.e. NATO) for years 1950-2010. If a 
delivery is identified but the recipient is not known with “an acceptable degree of certainty,” 
SIPRI categorizes such delivery as “unknown.” (SIPRI). 
 
Peer Nations 
One of the primary determinants relating to a state’s restriction of the proliferation of 
arms is the mastery of nuclear technologies, particularly weaponization (Struys, 2004). Initially, 
it was my intention to compare the US’s share of world arms exports to other nuclear nations. 
This, however, would not have yielded a true group of peers: North Korea, Pakistan, and India 
possess nuclear technologies and weapons but export nowhere near the volume as states like the 
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US and USSR/RF. As such, this classification would not be sufficient to provide for significant 
comparison. 
Upon examination of the SIPRI arms exports data, readers will be quick to realize the 
likeness of the top exporters. I have summarized the top 10 arms exporting states for the period 
of 1950-2010 in Table 5. Except for Italy, all top exporters currently or formerly utilized nuclear 
reactors for peaceful power production (World Nuclear Association). All top exporters, 
excluding Czechoslovakia, have or had nuclear weapons or access to nuclear weapons through a 
shared program (International Atomic Energy Agency). All top exporters have ratified the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT). A deciding difference that I will use for the purposes 
of comparisons is status as a permanent member to the UN Security Council. The permanent 
members include China, France, Russia, UK, US, and USSR (formerly). UNSC permanent 
member states all possess nuclear power programs, nuclear weapons, and have ratified the 
NNPT. The six states to have held the statues of a UNSC permanent member have accounted for 
approximately $1.4T of the $1.7T of worldwide arms exports between 1950 and 2010, or 84% of 
the market share. Non-UNSC members account for $266B of the arms exports over this period, 
approximately 16%. 
From the review of the US restrictions of arms exportation and the significance of the 
USDIB to the US policy and economy, I have identified 4 periods of time for which 
segmentation is required. The first period, the pre-AECA/ITAR period, encompasses 1950-1976 
and represents 27 observations. The second period, the post-AECA/ITAR enaction period, 
encompasses 1977-1991 and represents 15 observations. Following the collapse of the USSR, the 
world’s second largest (at the time, the largest) exporter of arms, the US market share soared,  
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Table 5 
Top 10 Arms Exporters & Nuclear Statuses 
State 
Total Export 
(US$m), 1950-
2010 
Nuclear 
Power 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
NNPT 
Member 
UNSC 
Permanent 
Member 
USA $608,583 Yes Yes Ratifier Yes 
USSR
1
 $459,565 Yes Yes Ratifier Yes 
UK $128,334 Yes Yes Ratifier Yes 
France $108,451 Yes Yes Ratifier Yes 
Russia
2
 $84,221 Yes Yes Ratifier Yes 
Germany (FRG) $75,018 Yes NATO Shared Ratifier No 
China $44,151 Yes Yes Ratifier Yes 
Czechoslovakia
3
 $30,256 Yes No Ratifier No 
Italy $26,352 No NATO Shared Ratifier No 
Netherlands $19,854 Yes NATO Shared Ratifier No 
 
Export data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, reflecting constant 1990 prices 
(US$m). Nuclear power, weapon and ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) data provided by 
the International Atomic Energy Commission. United Nation Security Council Permanent Member status provided 
by the United Nations. 
1: USSR dissolved in 1992. 
2: Russia replaced USSR as a UNSC Permanent Member in 1992. 
3: Czechoslovakia dissolved in 1993, becoming the Czech Republic and the Slovak Federal Republic. 
 
 
abetted by the US government. However, the mid 1990’s scandal and the amendments to the 
AECA that provided the DoS the authority to oversee ITAR licensing, this share sharply fell by 
the new millennium. Because of this divergence with trend, caused by changes to the US export 
protocols, we must segment the third period from 1992-1999 to account for the post-USSR, and 
accounts for 8 periods. The fourth and final period, the post-bubble period, encompasses 2000-
2010 and represents 11 observations. 
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Methodology 
The dependent variables in this study were the US annual shares of world arms exports 
and the US annual share of UNSC arms exports. Market share is the appropriate metric, as it 
adjusts for the natural geopolitical ebbs and flows of world demand for weapons. Further, an 
adjustment for inflation and exchange rates is required to compare the international players to US 
activity over the 61 periods (1950-2010) of data. This adjustment is made in the data provided by 
SIPRI, which reflects the 1990 US dollar purchasing power for volume of exports. The time 
series used begin in 1950 and end in 2010. There are 61 periods of data, with 27 annual 
observations constituting the pre-AECA/ITAR implementation series (1950-1976), 15 
observations of the post AECA/ITAR implementation (1977-1991), 8 observations of post 
USSR-collapse bubble (1992-1999), and 11 periods observations of DoS ITAR licensing (2000-
2010).  
This study’s analyses implement autoregressive, integrated moving average (ARIMA) 
models. ARIMA is well suited for assessing the impact of intervention, such as the enaction of 
regulations and restrictions, on a time series (Cook & Campbell, 1979). The first phase of an 
ARIMA analysis is the estimation of a univariate model that is independent of any regulation and 
restriction. This is referred to as the “noise model.” The second phase of an ARIMA model is the 
estimation of the restrictions on the time series through a transfer function. This is the 
intervention model. The statistical fit of the intervention model is then tested with several 
analytical metrics. If these metrics determine the intervention model to be inadequate, a new 
model is estimated until the most statistically significant model is found (Monforton & Windsor, 
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2010; Novoa et al, 2010; Pridemore & Snowden, 2009; Wagenaar, Maldonado-Molina, 
Wagennaar, 2009). 
For the analyses of this paper, all computations were performed by PASW Statistics 
(SPSS) Version 18. 
 
Results 
In the testing of the time series data to determine whether the US restrictions on arms 
exportation aversely effects the US share of world exports, it was determined that the ARIMA 
predicted model deviated significantly from the observations: details of this deviation are 
included in Appendix 4. The fraction of the sample variance explained, or predicted by, the 
dependent variable (R-square) allows for the determination of how well the regression line 
predicted by the ARIMA model fits the ex post observations. Both R-square and stationary R-
square were found to be 0.004, with a standard error of 0.002, and a 95% confidence metric of 
0.006. The mean root mean square error (RMSE), the measure representative of a “typical” error, 
was found to be 9.499, with a standard error of 11.812, and a 95% confidence metric of 17.851. 
The mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), which is useful for the purpose of reporting the 
generic percentage terms of an error for values that are strictly positive (for which all 
observations of this study are), was found to be 29.583, with a standard error of 40.688, and a 
95% confidence level of 58.308. It is important to note that RMSE is sensitive to large errors 
because of the squaring, which gives disproportionate weight to such errors. Given the nature of 
the volatility of the data, RMSE is not ideal for this analysis. MAPE, however, is more relevant, 
as the error is expressed in a percentage term and all dependent variables are positive. The 
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Ljung-Box statistic exhibits a significance measure of 0.000. The Ljung-Box statistic, shown in 
Appendix B, is key, as the lack of significance questions the importance of any deviation 
between the predicted model and the observed results (Ljung & Box, 1994). 
After reviewing the observed data, it has been determined that the bubble occurring in 
Period 3 is the source of a large amount of noise within the model, which drives the lack of 
significance found in the Ljung-Box statistics. This absence of significance forces inconclusive 
conclusions with respect to the initial hypotheses (H1 and H2). I submit the following 
replacement hypotheses: 
 
H5: US legislation and acts restricting US arms trade adversely affect the US market 
share of world arms exports during the Cold War. 
 
H6: US legislation and acts liberalizing US arms exportation have no impact on the US 
market share of world arms exports during the Cold War. 
 
H7: US legislation and acts restricting US arms trade adversely affect the US market 
share of world arms exports during the Post Cold War period. 
 
H8: US legislation and acts liberalizing US arms exportation have no impact on the US 
market share of world arms exports during the Post Cold War period. 
 
To test these revised hypotheses, I will conduct two independent ARIMA analyses: the 
first testing Periods 1 and 2, and the second testing Periods 3 and 4. This will adjust for the 
marked changes to both the US and world landscapes of arms exportation that followed the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact. 
In testing H5 and H6, the ARIMA model, again, exhibited significant deviation from the 
observations. Both R-square and stationary R-square were found to be 0.078, with a standard 
error of 0.067, and a 95% confidence metric of 0.126. The mean RMSE was found to be 6.344, 
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with a standard error of 8.2323, and a 95% confidence metric of 12.229. The MAPE was found 
to be 15.322, with a standard error of 20.949, and a 95% confidence level of 30.135. The Ljung-
Box statistic exhibits a significance metric of 0.000. The Expert Modeling feature of PAWS 
determined there to be no outliers. Results are shown in greater detail in Appendix 5. 
The final analysis of this group of hypotheses (H7 and H8) also exhibited significant 
deviation between the predicted ARIMA model and the observations. Both R-square and 
stationary R-square were found to be 0.820, with a standard error of 0.083, and a 95% 
confidence metric of 0.878. The mean RMSE was found to be 1.507, with a standard error of 
1.874, and a 95% confidence metric of 2.832. The MAPE was found to be 5.241, with a standard 
error of 7.258, and a 95% confidence level of 10.373. The Ljung-Box statistic exhibits a 
significance metric of 0.948. The Expert Modeling feature of PAWS determined there to be no 
outliers. Results are shown in greater detail in Appendix 6. 
For the testing of the time series data to determine whether the US share of arms 
exportation exhibited low or negative correlation to fellow UNSC nations, the ARIMA predicted 
models, again, exhibited significant deviation from the observed. Both R-square and stationary 
R-square were found to be 0.162, with a standard error of 0.022, and a 95% confidence metric of 
0.151. The mean RMSE was found to be 8.628, with a standard error of 10.695, and a 95% 
confidence metric of 1.065. The MAPE was found to be 26.512, with a standard error of 36.537, 
and a 95% confidence level of 0.677. The Ljung-Box statistic exhibits a significance metric of 
0.000. The Expert Modeling feature of PAWS determined there to be no outliers. Results are 
shown in greater detail in Appendix 7. 
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This analysis exhibits the same high degree of noise that the first ARIMA analysis did. 
To correct for this, I have revised H3 and H4: 
 
H9: US export policy regarding the trade of arms causes the US share of the market to 
correlate to changes in the market share of fellow UNSC members during the Cold War. 
 
H10: US export policy regarding the trade of arms does not causes correlation between 
US share of the market and the market share of fellow UNSC members during the Cold 
War. 
 
H11: US export policy regarding the trade of arms causes the US share of the market to 
correlate to changes in the market share of fellow UNSC members following the Cold 
War. 
 
H12: US export policy regarding the trade of arms does not causes correlation between 
US share of the market and the market share of fellow UNSC members following the 
Cold War. 
 
These hypotheses are revised in the same way as H5, H6, H7, and H8. I will conduct two 
independent ARIMA analyses: the first testing Periods 1 and 2, and the second testing Periods 3 
and 4. 
In testing H9 and H10, the ARIMA model, again, exhibited less deviation from the 
observations as the analysis for H3 and H4. Both R-square and stationary R-square were found to 
be 0.012, with a standard error of 0.001, and a 95% confidence metric of 0.13. The mean RMSE 
was found to be 6.421, with a standard error of 8.390, and a 95% confidence metric of 12.354. 
The MAPE was found to be 17.267, with a standard error of 23.664, and a 95% confidence level 
of 33.999. The Ljung-Box statistic exhibits a significance metric of 0.000. The Expert Modeling 
feature of PAWS determined there to be no outliers. Results are shown in greater detail in 
Appendix B. 
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The analysis of H11 and H12 provides evidence of significant deviation between the 
predicted ARIMA model and the observations. Both R-square and stationary R-square were 
found to be 0.760, with a standard error of 0.130, and a 95% confidence metric of 0.853. The 
mean RMSE was found to be 1.767, with a standard error of 2.216, and a 95% confidence metric 
of 3.334. The MAPE was found to be 5.960, with a standard error of 8.242, and a 95% 
confidence level of 11.788. The Ljung-Box statistic exhibits a significance metric of 0.947. The 
Expert Modeling feature of PAWS determined there to be no outliers. Results are shown in 
greater detail in Appendix B. 
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Discussion 
Test of US Share of World Arms Exports 
A large source of the noise occurring within the analyses results from the third 
segmentation: the post-USSR bubble. For this period, the average US share of world arms 
exports soared from 31.7% in Period 2 to 51.8% on Period 3, before falling back to 31.3% in 
Period 4. This is shown in Figure 3 and Table 6. This bubble causes the predicted model to 
violently deviate from the observed. Because of this, the analysis is inconclusive in determining 
whether US arms restrictions have a significant effect on the US’s share of world arms exports. 
The analysis for Periods 1 and 2 suggests the predicted deviates from the observed, 
however these measures do not exhibit a significant correlation between a shift in period and a 
shift in the moving average of the US’s share of world arms exports. As such, there is no 
justification to reject H6 and accept H5. It is important to note that the shift between Periods 1 
and 2 is in close proximity to the end of the Vietnam War and the election of Jimmy Carter. The 
end to the Vietnam War reduced the need of American allies to purchase military hardware that 
was compatible with the hardware US forces fought with (Maraniss, 2003). Jimmy Carter 
implemented a passive foreign policy, with respect to previous administrations (Carleton & 
Stohl, 1985). Together, these forces serve to skew the volume of deliveries to international 
customers. 
The analysis for Periods 3 and 4 provides markedly different significance. The ARIMA 
model found there to be significant correlation between the shift in period, occurring in 2000 
when the DoS began administering ITAR licenses, and the US’s share of world arms exports. 
Because of the significance of the Ljung-Box statistics, there is justification to accept H7 and to 
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reject H8, concluding that arms export controls impose up to a 20% decline in US share of the 
market. 
 
Figure 3 
Segmented Moving Average of US Market Share of Arms Exports, 1950-2010 
 
Notes: Based on SIPRI TIV Database results, period 1950-2010. For expanded periods or other nations’ 
shares, see Appendix A. 
 
 
Table 6 
Segmented Moving Average Synopsis, US Share of World Arms Exports 
 Period Average Market Share 
Period 1 1950 - 1976 36.1% 
Period 2 1977 - 1991 31.7% 
Period 3 1992 - 1999 51.8% 
Period 4 2000 - 2010 31.3% 
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Test of US Share of UNSC Arms Exports 
The second initial ARIMA analysis yielded results close to that of the first analysis. The 
Ljung-Box statistic of significance (0.000) again suggested a large amount of noise. This is not 
surprising, as this analysis seeks to determine the correlation between US and peer UNSC 
nations. As such, the noise of the USSR collapse bubble is magnified: shown in Figure 4 and 
Table 6. Because of the insignificance of this analysis, the results are inconclusive in determining 
the correlation between the US and UNSC states. 
After making similar adjustments to this test, as were done with the test of US share of 
world arms exports, there was no justification to accept H9 and reject H10. Again, this test is 
prone to the skew caused by the election of Jimmy Carter and the end to America’s presence (at 
least its overt presence) in Southeast Asia. However, in testing H11 and H12, there was a high 
degree of significance in the correlation between the shift of periods, occurring in 2000, and the 
shift in moving average of the US share of UNSC arms exports. To more clearly determine the 
correlation between the US and peer UNSC states in the exportation of arms, I have inserted 
Table 7. 
As shown above, the correlations of other UNSC states’ arms export shares frequently 
move inversely with the US’s share. It is not surprising that the USSR/US correlation is as 
significantly negative as -60% and -89% for Periods 1 and 2, respectively. But the negative 
correlations of France, Russia, and UK suggest that these states are willing to fill voids in 
demand the US cannot supply because of export restrictions. This holds with Rains’s (2008) 
remarks regarding ITAR as a restriction to US exports that serves as a catalyst to the 
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proliferation of advanced technologies. This correlation matrix, however, is not scientific and 
cannot be used to draw conclusions from. It does, however, suggest areas for further study. 
 
Figure 4 
Segmented Moving Average of US Market Share of UNSC Arms Exports, 1950-2010
 
Notes: Based on SIPRI TIV Database results, period 1950-2010. For expanded periods or other nations’ 
shares, see Appendix A. 
 
 
Table 6 
Segmented Moving Average Synopsis, US Share of UNSC Arms Exports 
 Period Average Market Share 
Period 1 1950 - 1976 39.5% 
Period 2 1977 - 1991 37.5% 
Period 3 1992 - 1999 65.0% 
Period 4 2000 - 2010 43.6% 
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Table 7 
Segmented Correlation to US Share of UNSC Arms Exports 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
China 2.74% 10.19% 34.26% 0.20% 
France 31.58% -66.39% -12.74% -38.20% 
Russia   -87.71% -93.28% 
UK -48.56% 18.57% -69.33% 15.40% 
USSR -60.31% -88.59%   
 
 
Study Limitations 
Though the data provided by SIPRI is of incredible quality, it is annual in frequency. 
Further, data is only available from 1950-present. The number of periods does not support time 
series analyses the likes of ARIMA. This deficiency and the dramatic shifts in arms exportation 
trends that has occurred over the last 50 years causes a large deal of noise in the ARIMA models 
that cannot be readily adjusted for at present. 
It needs to be acknowledged that the proliferation of armaments has illicit themes that 
cannot be accounted for at the present time (Koorey et al., 2008; Wezeman, 2010). Further, 
SIPRI has frequently noted that the TIVs for China are suspect (Jakobson & Knox, 2010). 
China’s importation and exportation of armaments is kept very quiet within Beijing. At present, 
this lack of transparency can be seen as a further source of noise within the ARIMA analyses. 
Again, I have attempted to provide readers with an encompassing picture of US 
international arms trends within the scope of this study, and only drawn conclusions on the basis 
of statistically significant results. 
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Topics for Future Research 
A logical step for future research would be an examination of procurement policies and 
the strategic dynamics between the USDIB and the DoD. The USDIB is regarded as exhibiting 
strong oligopoly traits per Stigler’s 1964 theory and the US government is believed to hold a 
monopsony position in procuring weapons (Rogerson, 1999). Solmirano & Wezemen (2010) 
have examined the procurement policies of Gulf States, and the extension of such an 
examination to the US and USDIB would provide understanding into what can be called an 
industrial anomaly: an oligopoly supplying a monopsony. Such an assessment would draw 
heavily from the field of strategic management to determine whether firms are exploiting a 
competitive advantage within the industry and how the Executive Branch counters such an 
advantage through regulations that skew bargaining power, such as the Truth in Negotiations Act 
(Riemer, 1997). 
A secondary study for future research would by an analysis to determine how the DIBs of 
other nations interact with their domestic governments and how this interaction affects their 
international presence. It has been determined that other DIBs experienced similar market 
conditions following the cession of Cold War tensions (Struys, 2004). In determining the 
dynamics at play between foreign DIBs and their governments, it would likely be shown as to 
how these policies evolved and if considerations were made to allow for eased exports following 
the collapse of the Bloc. 
Should data be made publically available that exhibits greater detail, transparency, and 
accuracy, I would like to reexamine this subject and to explore the implications of restricted 
DUT exportation. With such increased detail, future analyses will be able to reduce the presence 
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of noise within time-series models and provide greater certainty in concluding the financial 
implications of arms export restrictions. 
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Conclusions 
The USDIB is a vital component to the US economy. Through the evolution of federal 
regulations, it has become a pawn in the game of foreign policy. The ethics of this positioning, 
brought on by the US federal government, can be debated. However, it is not within the contexts 
of this paper to debate this. What is within the context of this paper is the realization that the US 
export controls, primarily the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, is a significant external factor 
affecting the USDIB’s ability to engage in international sales. 
The ARIMA analyses presented in this paper have shown that the imposition of or 
amendment to leading export controls affecting the USDIB significantly correlates with up to a 
20% decline of the US’s share of world arms exports. This finding provides for the justification 
of concluding that export restrictions impose significant financial burdens upon the USDIB 
because of decreased international sales. 
Further, it should be acknowledged that the US’s peers (China, France, Russia, and UK) 
exhibit frequent inverse correlations to the US’s arms export trends. Though this correlation was 
not scientifically concluded, it is foolish to ignore, as it provides for evidence that export 
restrictions do not slow the proliferation of weapons systems. Rather, they serve to speed up such 
proliferation by providing other states with the economic justification to undertake costly R&D 
projects to replicate technology already mastered by the US, to refine technology initially 
mastered by the US, or to surpass the US in technological capabilities. 
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Appendix A: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Data
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World Arms Exports, Constant 1990 Prices (US$m) 
Year China France Russia US USSR UK Ex-UNSC World Total 
1950   13   1,644 3,241 2,381 396 7,675 
1951   56   4,625 3,117 3,199 407 11,404 
1952 8 36   6,322 6,157 3,132 596 16,251 
1953 16 294   9,223 8,466 4,018 428 22,445 
1954 19 332   5,604 9,473 4,285 478 20,191 
1955 16 465   6,739 6,842 4,974 1,929 20,965 
1956 51 860   8,343 7,117 6,155 2,356 24,882 
1957 30 665   8,328 7,661 5,205 2,357 24,246 
1958 478 695   9,686 9,102 3,901 2,667 26,529 
1959 376 778   7,719 8,014 3,009 1,405 21,301 
1960 305 1,171   6,096 5,843 1,942 1,658 17,015 
1961 37 1,084   6,679 7,064 1,083 1,606 17,553 
1962 54 1,523   5,742 7,868 1,167 1,614 17,968 
1963 11 1,695   9,364 6,960 986 1,421 20,437 
1964 61 1,896   12,570 8,601 1,270 2,410 26,808 
1965 450 1,699   11,467 8,819 1,425 2,285 26,145 
1966 675 1,731   8,528 10,476 1,357 2,690 25,457 
1967 439 1,596   7,435 11,395 2,225 2,638 25,728 
1968 725 1,873   8,385 11,001 1,582 2,602 26,168 
1969 639 1,326   11,589 10,408 1,893 2,992 28,847 
1970 866 1,777   9,069 10,158 908 3,127 25,905 
1971 1,271 2,348   11,156 11,498 2,247 3,870 32,390 
1972 1,168 2,533   10,199 13,751 2,378 3,868 33,897 
1973 698 2,839   12,288 15,085 2,714 2,018 35,642 
1974 611 2,122   11,968 14,995 2,388 3,607 35,691 
1975 654 2,388   15,950 11,483 2,191 4,690 37,356 
1976 608 2,110   15,819 10,330 2,360 4,868 36,095 
1977 226 2,800   15,726 15,616 2,232 5,026 41,626 
1978 638 3,207   14,896 18,282 2,028 5,091 44,142 
1979 599 2,968   10,081 18,226 1,427 6,402 39,703 
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World Arms Exports, Constant 1990 Prices (US$m): Continued. 
Year China France Russia US USSR UK Ex-UNSC World Total 
1980 979 3,697   11,083 18,120 1,659 6,707 42,245 
1981 707 3,650   13,895 16,997 2,351 7,976 45,576 
1982 1,590 3,641   14,209 16,245 2,453 7,720 45,858 
1983 1,924 3,130   13,726 14,374 2,411 7,688 43,253 
1984 2,189 2,807   11,497 13,830 2,464 8,260 41,047 
1985 1,440 3,773   10,493 14,407 2,090 5,539 37,742 
1986 2,099 2,944   11,544 14,571 1,929 5,842 38,929 
1987 3,337 1,732   12,310 13,313 3,327 5,977 39,996 
1988 1,960 1,827   11,811 12,688 2,339 6,773 37,398 
1989 1,033 2,115   11,320 12,495 3,325 5,280 35,568 
1990 930 1,673   10,647 10,017 1,900 4,944 30,111 
1991 1,317 1,029   12,632 5,459 1,495 6,085 28,017 
1992 735 1,056 2,700 14,113   1,203 4,467 24,274 
1993 1,438 791 3,477 14,456   1,469 4,899 26,530 
1994 1,136 764 1,552 11,781   1,516 6,364 23,113 
1995 1,050 942 3,812 11,400   1,520 4,574 23,298 
1996 803 1,899 3,508 11,197   1,636 5,057 24,100 
1997 452 3,149 2,966 14,612   2,411 4,964 28,554 
1998 362 3,362 1,966 16,176   1,374 5,038 28,278 
1999 336 1,813 4,043 11,599   1,331 5,721 24,843 
2000 301 1,056 3,960 7,398   1,606 4,182 18,503 
2001 499 1,297 5,896 5,908   1,368 4,434 19,402 
2002 509 1,368 5,705 5,229   1,068 4,027 17,906 
2003 665 1,345 5,236 5,698   741 5,584 19,269 
2004 292 2,219 6,178 6,866   1,316 4,381 21,252 
2005 303 1,724 5,134 6,700   1,039 6,119 21,019 
2006 597 1,643 5,095 7,453   855 8,144 23,787 
2007 430 2,432 5,426 8,003   1,018 9,075 26,384 
2008 586 1,994 5,953 6,288   982 7,433 23,236 
2009 1,000 1,865 5,575 6,658   1,022 7,900 24,020 
2010 1,423 834 6,039 8,641   1,054 6,996 24,987 
Total 44,151 108,451 84,221 608,583 459,565 128,334 265,652 1,698,957 
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Market Share of World Arms Exports 
Year China France Russia US USSR UK Ex-UNSC World Total 
1950 0% 0% 0% 21% 42% 31% 5% 100% 
1951 0% 0% 0% 41% 27% 28% 4% 100% 
1952 0% 0% 0% 39% 38% 19% 4% 100% 
1953 0% 1% 0% 41% 38% 18% 2% 100% 
1954 0% 2% 0% 28% 47% 21% 2% 100% 
1955 0% 2% 0% 32% 33% 24% 9% 100% 
1956 0% 3% 0% 34% 29% 25% 9% 100% 
1957 0% 3% 0% 34% 32% 21% 10% 100% 
1958 2% 3% 0% 37% 34% 15% 10% 100% 
1959 2% 4% 0% 36% 38% 14% 7% 100% 
1960 2% 7% 0% 36% 34% 11% 10% 100% 
1961 0% 6% 0% 38% 40% 6% 9% 100% 
1962 0% 8% 0% 32% 44% 6% 9% 100% 
1963 0% 8% 0% 46% 34% 5% 7% 100% 
1964 0% 7% 0% 47% 32% 5% 9% 100% 
1965 2% 6% 0% 44% 34% 5% 9% 100% 
1966 3% 7% 0% 33% 41% 5% 11% 100% 
1967 2% 6% 0% 29% 44% 9% 10% 100% 
1968 3% 7% 0% 32% 42% 6% 10% 100% 
1969 2% 5% 0% 40% 36% 7% 10% 100% 
1970 3% 7% 0% 35% 39% 4% 12% 100% 
1971 4% 7% 0% 34% 35% 7% 12% 100% 
1972 3% 7% 0% 30% 41% 7% 11% 100% 
1973 2% 8% 0% 34% 42% 8% 6% 100% 
1974 2% 6% 0% 34% 42% 7% 10% 100% 
1975 2% 6% 0% 43% 31% 6% 13% 100% 
1976 2% 6% 0% 44% 29% 7% 13% 100% 
1977 1% 7% 0% 38% 38% 5% 12% 100% 
1978 1% 7% 0% 34% 41% 5% 12% 100% 
1979 2% 7% 0% 25% 46% 4% 16% 100% 
1980 2% 9% 0% 26% 43% 4% 16% 100% 
1981 2% 8% 0% 30% 37% 5% 18% 100% 
1982 3% 8% 0% 31% 35% 5% 17% 100% 
1983 4% 7% 0% 32% 33% 6% 18% 100% 
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Market Share of World Arms Exports: Continued. 
Year China France Russian US USSR UK Ex-UNSC World Total 
1984 5% 7% 0% 28% 34% 6% 20% 100% 
1985 4% 10% 0% 28% 38% 6% 15% 100% 
1986 5% 8% 0% 30% 37% 5% 15% 100% 
1987 8% 4% 0% 31% 33% 8% 15% 100% 
1988 5% 5% 0% 32% 34% 6% 18% 100% 
1989 3% 6% 0% 32% 35% 9% 15% 100% 
1990 3% 6% 0% 35% 33% 6% 16% 100% 
1991 5% 4% 0% 45% 19% 5% 22% 100% 
1992 3% 4% 11% 58% 0% 5% 18% 100% 
1993 5% 3% 13% 54% 0% 6% 18% 100% 
1994 5% 3% 7% 51% 0% 7% 28% 100% 
1995 5% 4% 16% 49% 0% 7% 20% 100% 
1996 3% 8% 15% 46% 0% 7% 21% 100% 
1997 2% 11% 10% 51% 0% 8% 17% 100% 
1998 1% 12% 7% 57% 0% 5% 18% 100% 
1999 1% 7% 16% 47% 0% 5% 23% 100% 
2000 2% 6% 21% 40% 0% 9% 23% 100% 
2001 3% 7% 30% 30% 0% 7% 23% 100% 
2002 3% 8% 32% 29% 0% 6% 22% 100% 
2003 3% 7% 27% 30% 0% 4% 29% 100% 
2004 1% 10% 29% 32% 0% 6% 21% 100% 
2005 1% 8% 24% 32% 0% 5% 29% 100% 
2006 3% 7% 21% 31% 0% 4% 34% 100% 
2007 2% 9% 21% 30% 0% 4% 34% 100% 
2008 3% 9% 26% 27% 0% 4% 32% 100% 
2009 4% 8% 23% 28% 0% 4% 33% 100% 
2010 6% 3% 24% 35% 0% 4% 28% 100% 
Total 3% 6% 5% 36% 27% 8% 16% 100% 
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Market Share of UNSC Arms Exports 
Year China France Russia US USSR UK World Total 
1950 0% 0% 0% 23% 45% 33% 100% 
1951 0% 1% 0% 42% 28% 29% 100% 
1952 0% 0% 0% 40% 39% 20% 100% 
1953 0% 1% 0% 42% 38% 18% 100% 
1954 0% 2% 0% 28% 48% 22% 100% 
1955 0% 2% 0% 35% 36% 26% 100% 
1956 0% 4% 0% 37% 32% 27% 100% 
1957 0% 3% 0% 38% 35% 24% 100% 
1958 2% 3% 0% 41% 38% 16% 100% 
1959 2% 4% 0% 39% 40% 15% 100% 
1960 2% 8% 0% 40% 38% 13% 100% 
1961 0% 7% 0% 42% 44% 7% 100% 
1962 0% 9% 0% 35% 48% 7% 100% 
1963 0% 9% 0% 49% 37% 5% 100% 
1964 0% 8% 0% 52% 35% 5% 100% 
1965 2% 7% 0% 48% 37% 6% 100% 
1966 3% 8% 0% 37% 46% 6% 100% 
1967 2% 7% 0% 32% 49% 10% 100% 
1968 3% 8% 0% 36% 47% 7% 100% 
1969 2% 5% 0% 45% 40% 7% 100% 
1970 4% 8% 0% 40% 45% 4% 100% 
1971 4% 8% 0% 39% 40% 8% 100% 
1972 4% 8% 0% 34% 46% 8% 100% 
1973 2% 8% 0% 37% 45% 8% 100% 
1974 2% 7% 0% 37% 47% 7% 100% 
1975 2% 7% 0% 49% 35% 7% 100% 
1976 2% 7% 0% 51% 33% 8% 100% 
1977 1% 8% 0% 43% 43% 6% 100% 
1978 2% 8% 0% 38% 47% 5% 100% 
1979 2% 9% 0% 30% 55% 4% 100% 
1980 3% 10% 0% 31% 51% 5% 100% 
1981 2% 10% 0% 37% 45% 6% 100% 
1982 4% 10% 0% 37% 43% 6% 100% 
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Market Share of UNSC Arms Exports: Continued. 
Year China France Russia US USSR UK World Total 
1983 5% 9% 0% 39% 40% 7% 100% 
1984 7% 9% 0% 35% 42% 8% 100% 
1985 4% 12% 0% 33% 45% 6% 100% 
1986 6% 9% 0% 35% 44% 6% 100% 
1987 10% 5% 0% 36% 39% 10% 100% 
1988 6% 6% 0% 39% 41% 8% 100% 
1989 3% 7% 0% 37% 41% 11% 100% 
1990 4% 7% 0% 42% 40% 8% 100% 
1991 6% 5% 0% 58% 25% 7% 100% 
1992 4% 5% 14% 71% 0% 6% 100% 
1993 7% 4% 16% 67% 0% 7% 100% 
1994 7% 5% 9% 70% 0% 9% 100% 
1995 6% 5% 20% 61% 0% 8% 100% 
1996 4% 10% 18% 59% 0% 9% 100% 
1997 2% 13% 13% 62% 0% 10% 100% 
1998 2% 14% 8% 70% 0% 6% 100% 
1999 2% 9% 21% 61% 0% 7% 100% 
2000 2% 7% 28% 52% 0% 11% 100% 
2001 3% 9% 39% 39% 0% 9% 100% 
2002 4% 10% 41% 38% 0% 8% 100% 
2003 5% 10% 38% 42% 0% 5% 100% 
2004 2% 13% 37% 41% 0% 8% 100% 
2005 2% 12% 34% 45% 0% 7% 100% 
2006 4% 11% 33% 48% 0% 5% 100% 
2007 2% 14% 31% 46% 0% 6% 100% 
2008 4% 13% 38% 40% 0% 6% 100% 
2009 6% 12% 35% 41% 0% 6% 100% 
2010 8% 5% 34% 48% 0% 6% 100% 
Total 3% 8% 6% 42% 32% 9% 100% 
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Appendix B: Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) Analyses
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ARIMA Model Outputs, US Share of World Arms Exports – H1 & H2 
Model Fit 
Fit Statistic Mean SE Minimum Maximum 
Percentile 
5 10 25 
Stationary R-squared .004 .002 .003 .006 .003 .003 .003 
R-squared .004 .002 .003 .006 .003 .003 .003 
RMSE 9.499 11.812 1.146 17.851 1.146 1.146 1.146 
MAPE 29.538 40.688 .767 58.308 .767 .767 .767 
MaxAPE 57.820 79.616 1.523 114.117 1.523 1.523 1.523 
MAE 8.057 10.083 .927 15.187 .927 .927 .927 
MaxAE 16.198 20.080 1.999 30.396 1.999 1.999 1.999 
Normalized BIC 3.153 3.883 .408 5.899 .408 .408 .408 
 
 
Model Fit 
Fit Statistic 
Percentile 
50 75 90 95 
Stationary R-squared .004 .006 .006 .006 
R-squared .004 .006 .006 .006 
RMSE 9.499 17.851 17.851 17.851 
MAPE 29.538 58.308 58.308 58.308 
MaxAPE 57.820 114.117 114.117 114.117 
MAE 8.057 15.187 15.187 15.187 
MaxAE 16.198 30.396 30.396 30.396 
Normalized BIC 3.153 5.899 5.899 5.899 
 
Model Statistics 
Model 
Number of 
Predictors 
Model Fit 
statistics Ljung-Box Q(18) 
Stationary R-
squared Statistics DF 
YEAR, not periodic-Model_1 1 .006 432.510 18 
Period-Model_2 1 .003 404.314 18 
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ARIMA Model Outputs, US Share of World Arms Exports – H1 & H2: Continued. 
Model Statistics 
Model 
Ljung-Box 
Q(18) Number of 
Outliers Sig. 
YEAR, not periodic-Model_1 .000 0 
Period-Model_2 .000 0 
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ARIMA Model Outputs, US Share of UNSC Arms Exports – H3 & H4 
Model Fit 
Fit Statistic Mean SE Minimum Maximum 
Percentile 
5 10 25 
Stationary R-squared .166 .022 .151 .182 .151 .151 .151 
R-squared .166 .022 .151 .182 .151 .151 .151 
RMSE 8.628 10.695 1.065 16.191 1.065 1.065 1.065 
MAPE 26.512 36.537 .677 52.348 .677 .677 .677 
MaxAPE 70.708 97.851 1.517 139.899 1.517 1.517 1.517 
MAE 7.115 8.882 .834 13.396 .834 .834 .834 
MaxAE 16.323 19.994 2.184 30.461 2.184 2.184 2.184 
Normalized BIC 2.983 3.848 .262 5.704 .262 .262 .262 
 
Model Fit 
Fit Statistic 
Percentile 
50 75 90 95 
Stationary R-squared .166 .182 .182 .182 
R-squared .166 .182 .182 .182 
RMSE 8.628 16.191 16.191 16.191 
MAPE 26.512 52.348 52.348 52.348 
MaxAPE 70.708 139.899 139.899 139.899 
MAE 7.115 13.396 13.396 13.396 
MaxAE 16.323 30.461 30.461 30.461 
Normalized BIC 2.983 5.704 5.704 5.704 
 
Model Statistics 
Model 
Number of 
Predictors 
Model Fit 
statistics Ljung-Box Q(18) 
Stationary R-
squared Statistics DF 
YEAR, not periodic-Model_1 1 .182 269.726 18 
Period-Model_2 1 .151 250.949 18 
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ARIMA Model Outputs, US Share of UNSC Arms Exports – H3 & H4: Continued. 
Model Statistics 
Model 
Ljung-Box 
Q(18) Number of 
Outliers Sig. 
YEAR, not periodic-Model_1 .000 0 
Period-Model_2 .000 0 
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ARIMA Model Outputs, US Share of World Arms Exports – H5 & H6 
Model Fit 
Fit Statistic Mean SE Minimum Maximum 
Percentile 
5 10 25 
Stationary R-squared .078 .067 .031 .126 .031 .031 .031 
R-squared .078 .067 .031 .126 .031 .031 .031 
RMSE 6.344 8.323 .459 12.229 .459 .459 .459 
MAPE 15.322 20.949 .509 30.135 .509 .509 .509 
MaxAPE 37.661 51.428 1.296 74.026 1.296 1.296 1.296 
MAE 5.211 6.801 .402 10.020 .402 .402 .402 
MaxAE 13.116 17.203 .952 25.280 .952 .952 .952 
Normalized BIC 1.903 4.642 -1.379 5.186 -1.379 -1.379 -1.379 
 
Model Fit 
Fit Statistic 
Percentile 
50 75 90 95 
Stationary R-squared .078 .126 .126 .126 
R-squared .078 .126 .126 .126 
RMSE 6.344 12.229 12.229 12.229 
MAPE 15.322 30.135 30.135 30.135 
MaxAPE 37.661 74.026 74.026 74.026 
MAE 5.211 10.020 10.020 10.020 
MaxAE 13.116 25.280 25.280 25.280 
Normalized BIC 1.903 5.186 5.186 5.186 
 
Model Statistics 
Model 
Number of 
Predictors 
Model Fit 
statistics Ljung-Box Q(18) 
Stationary R-
squared Statistics DF 
YEAR, not periodic-Model_1 1 .031 181.832 18 
Period-Model_2 1 .126 134.798 18 
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ARIMA Model Outputs, US Share of World Arms Exports – H5 & H6: Continued. 
Model Statistics 
Model 
Ljung-Box 
Q(18) Number of 
Outliers Sig. 
YEAR, not periodic-Model_1 .000 0 
Period-Model_2 .000 0 
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ARIMA Model Outputs, US Share of World Arms Exports – H7 & H8 
Model Fit 
Fit Statistic Mean SE Minimum Maximum 
Percentile 
5 10 25 
Stationary R-squared .820 .083 .761 .878 .761 .761 .761 
R-squared .820 .083 .761 .878 .761 .761 .761 
RMSE 1.507 1.874 .182 2.832 .182 .182 .182 
MAPE 5.241 7.258 .108 10.373 .108 .108 .108 
MaxAPE 15.062 20.834 .330 29.793 .330 .330 .330 
MAE 1.149 1.435 .134 2.163 .134 .134 .134 
MaxAE 3.528 4.390 .424 6.632 .424 .424 .424 
Normalized BIC -.353 3.882 -3.098 2.392 -3.098 -3.098 -3.098 
 
Model Fit 
Fit Statistic 
Percentile 
50 75 90 95 
Stationary R-squared .820 .878 .878 .878 
R-squared .820 .878 .878 .878 
RMSE 1.507 2.832 2.832 2.832 
MAPE 5.241 10.373 10.373 10.373 
MaxAPE 15.062 29.793 29.793 29.793 
MAE 1.149 2.163 2.163 2.163 
MaxAE 3.528 6.632 6.632 6.632 
Normalized BIC -.353 2.392 2.392 2.392 
 
Model Statistics 
Model 
Number of 
Predictors 
Model Fit 
statistics Ljung-Box Q(18) 
Stationary R-
squared Statistics DF 
YEAR, not periodic-Model_1 1 .761 24.911 18 
Period-Model_2 1 .878 9.479 18 
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ARIMA Model Outputs, US Share of World Arms Exports – H7 & H8: Continued. 
Model Statistics 
Model 
Ljung-Box 
Q(18) Number of 
Outliers Sig. 
YEAR, not periodic-Model_1 .127 0 
Period-Model_2 .948 0 
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ARIMA Model Outputs, US Share of UNSC Arms Exports – H9 & H10 
Model Fit 
Fit Statistic Mean SE Minimum Maximum 
Percentile 
5 10 25 
Stationary R-squared .012 .001 .011 .013 .011 .011 .011 
R-squared .012 .001 .011 .013 .011 .011 .011 
RMSE 6.421 8.390 .488 12.354 .488 .488 .488 
MAPE 17.267 23.664 .534 33.999 .534 .534 .534 
MaxAPE 25.239 34.237 1.030 49.448 1.030 1.030 1.030 
MAE 5.486 7.118 .453 10.520 .453 .453 .453 
MaxAE 10.448 13.647 .799 20.098 .799 .799 .799 
Normalized BIC 1.974 4.570 -1.258 5.206 -1.258 -1.258 -1.258 
 
Model Fit 
Fit Statistic 
Percentile 
50 75 90 95 
Stationary R-squared .012 .013 .013 .013 
R-squared .012 .013 .013 .013 
RMSE 6.421 12.354 12.354 12.354 
MAPE 17.267 33.999 33.999 33.999 
MaxAPE 25.239 49.448 49.448 49.448 
MAE 5.486 10.520 10.520 10.520 
MaxAE 10.448 20.098 20.098 20.098 
Normalized BIC 1.974 5.206 5.206 5.206 
 
Model Statistics 
Model 
Number of 
Predictors 
Model Fit 
statistics Ljung-Box Q(18) 
Stationary R-
squared Statistics DF 
YEAR, not periodic-Model_1 1 .011 219.579 18 
Period-Model_2 1 .013 185.177 18 
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ARIMA Model Outputs, US Share of UNSC Arms Exports – H9 & H10: Continued. 
Model Statistics 
Model 
Ljung-Box 
Q(18) Number of 
Outliers Sig. 
YEAR, not periodic-Model_1 .000 0 
Period-Model_2 .000 0 
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ARIMA Model Outputs, US Share of UNSC Arms Exports – H11 & H12 
Model Fit 
Fit Statistic Mean SE Minimum Maximum 
Percentile 
5 10 25 
Stationary R-squared .760 .130 .668 .853 .668 .668 .668 
R-squared .760 .130 .668 .853 .668 .668 .668 
RMSE 1.767 2.216 .200 3.334 .200 .200 .200 
MAPE 5.960 8.242 .132 11.788 .132 .132 .132 
MaxAPE 16.829 23.292 .359 33.299 .359 .359 .359 
MAE 1.406 1.763 .160 2.653 .160 .160 .160 
MaxAE 3.801 4.833 .384 7.218 .384 .384 .384 
Normalized BIC -.093 3.976 -2.905 2.718 -2.905 -2.905 -2.905 
 
Model Fit 
Fit Statistic 
Percentile 
50 75 90 95 
Stationary R-squared .760 .853 .853 .853 
R-squared .760 .853 .853 .853 
RMSE 1.767 3.334 3.334 3.334 
MAPE 5.960 11.788 11.788 11.788 
MaxAPE 16.829 33.299 33.299 33.299 
MAE 1.406 2.653 2.653 2.653 
MaxAE 3.801 7.218 7.218 7.218 
Normalized BIC -.093 2.718 2.718 2.718 
 
Model Statistics 
Model 
Number of 
Predictors 
Model Fit 
statistics Ljung-Box Q(18) 
Stationary R-
squared Statistics DF 
YEAR, not periodic-Model_1 1 .668 26.410 18 
Period-Model_2 1 .853 9.501 18 
 
 
64 
ARIMA Model Outputs, US Share of UNSC Arms Exports – H11 & H12: Continued. 
Model Statistics 
Model 
Ljung-Box 
Q(18) Number of 
Outliers Sig. 
YEAR, not periodic-Model_1 .091 0 
Period-Model_2 .947 0 
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